

# Psychological Models of Causal Inference

# Paradigmatic Experiment

- A set of binary potential causes:  $C_1, \dots, C_n$
- A known binary effect:  $E$ 
  - This distinction is given to the participant
  - Cover stories are explicitly designed to minimize the role of prior beliefs
- Observational data about variable values
  - Different formats: online, list, or summary

# Paradigmatic Experiment

Experiment

Number correct: 10/25

What causes Hemeosis?  
Endolytes? Acrocysts? Some other factor?

Patient #26

(High)

(Low)

Endolytes Acrocysts Hemeosis: ????

Do you think Hemeosis is present or absent?

Present Absent

Java Applet Window

Experiment

Number correct: 11/26

Correct!

What causes Hemeosis?  
Endolytes? Acrocysts? Some other factor?

Patient #26

(High)

(Low)

Endolytes Acrocysts Hemeosis: Absent

See patient #27...

Java Applet Window

# Paradigmatic Experiment

- Obtain verbal estimates of causal influence
  - Often, ratings on a -100 to +100 scale
  - Responses are somewhat sensitive to question
  - Occasionally, structural beliefs are obtained using a range of interfaces
- Goal of theories: model the (mean) ratings as a function of the observed series of cases (usually, just the probability distribution)
  - Or a series of (mean) ratings

# Conditional $\Delta P$ Theory

- Predictions of causal strength judgments are only made in the large-sample limit, and are proportional to the conditional contrast(s):

$$\Delta P_{C.\{X\}} = P(E | C \& X) - P(E | \sim C \& X)$$

- This theory makes no determinate prediction if no conditional contrasts are defined, or if the contrasts for a potential cause vary

# Causal Power Theory

- Events are due to unobservable causal capacities (*a la* Cartwright)
- Causal learning is the estimation of the frequency of operation of these capacities

Generative Cause

$$P_C = \frac{\Delta P_C}{1 - P(E | \neg C)}$$

Preventive Cause


$$P_C = \frac{-\Delta P_C}{P(E | \neg C)}$$

# Central Claim

- Bayes nets provide a good model of people's causal beliefs
  - All of the non-Bayes net psychological theories are parameter estimators for a particular, fixed-structure Bayes net
  - There are interesting psychological theories of causal learning based on Bayes nets


# Unifying the Other Theories

- Claim: Causal Bayes nets can provide a framework to unify the other theories.




- Assume that  $B$  always occurs
- Specify  $P(E) = f(C\text{'s occurrence}, w_C, w_B)$ 
  - Not the only way to specify it, but convenient

# Unifying the Other Theories




- Suppose  $P(E) = w_B + w_C \times \delta(C)$ 
  - where  $\delta(C) = 1$  if  $C$  occurs, 0 otherwise
- $\Delta P$  is the maximum likelihood estimate of  $w_C$ 
  - So  $\Delta P$  can be reinterpreted as a parameter estimator for a fixed-structure, fixed-functional form Bayes net!

# Unifying the Other Theories



- Or:  $P(E) = w_B + w_C \times \delta(C) - w_B \times w_C \times \delta(C)$
- Causal power is the maximum likelihood estimate for  $w_C$  in *this* equation
  - I.e., Power PC is also a parameter estimator

# Unifying the Other Theories



- $\Delta P$  and power PC (and their dynamical versions) are doing exactly the same thing, except that they assume different underlying functional forms

# Potential Problem

- Observing a variable and manipulating that variable are not the same
- The observation / manipulation distinction is essentially not drawn in the parameter estimation theories
  - So how could they possibly be right?

# Interventions & Estimators

- Interventions only break incoming arrows, so observation and intervention are the same for *exogenous* variables
  - I.e., variables with no incoming arrows
- We can draw exactly the same inferences from (a) observation of an exogenous variable; and (b) intervention on one

# Intervention & Estimators

- It's fine for the psychological theories to ignore the observation / manipulation distinction, because:

*There is no observation / manipulation distinction in the assumed, fixed-structure causal Bayes net!*

# Bayes Net Psychology

- Two different strategies:
  - Rational analysis of human causal learning
    - Model people as using a causal Bayes net structure learning algorithm, even though they might actually be using heuristic methods
  - Causal model theory
    - People start with an initial causal structure, try to fit the observed data to it, and change their minds only if the data are sufficiently anomalous

# Bayes Net Psychology

- Two types of experimental tests
  - Prediction from - and use of - interventions
  - Learning integrated causal structures
- Data from both types of experiments support richer Bayes net theories (and not just parameter estimation)